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SOME TAX CONSIDERATIONS
AFFECTING THE DESIGN OF A
CHAPTER X REORGANIZATION
Don Steger Harnack*
This discussion shall point out the inconsistent tax treatment af-
forded varying kinds of Chapter X insolvency reorganizations under
the present Internal Revenue Code.
By looking to the applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Act, their
effort upon a reorganization, and the inter-relation of the bankkruptcy
statutes and the taxing statutes, it will be possible to recognize and
appraise some of the problems that must be taken into consideration
by any party contemplating an insolvency reorganization.
Application of Section 112(b) (10)2 of the Internal Revenue Code
to Chapter X reorganization turns upon the form that the reorganiza-
tion takes. The terms of Section 112(b)(10) limit it to those re-
organizations that make use of a transfer of property to some other
corporation. The section does not apply to a reorganization accom-
plished by an internal structural change, whereby the corporation out-
wardly maintains the same corporate entity. This latter type of re-
organization shall be referred to as a recapitalization.
It is hoped that, after viewing the variable treatment accorded
these two types of reorganizations, it will be evident that statutory
changes are necessary in this area.
APPLICATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
A primary purpose of Section 77B3 , and its subsequent refinement
in Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act as amended in 1938,
was to furnish insolvent corporations greater opportunity to revive
through reorganization. It was hoped that greater flexibility in the re-
organization sections of Chapter X would help lessen the number of
absolute failures, thereby minimizing the disruptive effect of a busi-
ness recession upon the entire national economy.
Chapter X incorporates, with numerous changes and additions,
former Section 77B of the National Bankruptcy Act. Those additions
of primary importance for the purpose of this discussion are Sections
2684 and 2705. It was intended by the enactment of Section 268 to
*Harvard L.L.B. 1953, Member of the Wisconsin Bar.
'Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act as Amended, 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C.§501 (1946).
•'2INT. REv. CoDE §112(b) (10).
348 STAT. 911 (1934), 11 U.S.C. §207 (1946).
452 STAT.'904 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §668 (1946).
552 STAT. 904 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §670 (1940).
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avoid taxing the debtor corporation upon the gain arising from a
modification in, or cancellation of, any indebtness resulting under a
Chapter X proceeding, aiming particularly at avoiding those tax as-
sessments predicated upon the doctrine of United States v. Kirby Lum-
ber Co.6 Mr Banks,7 the party primarily responsible for the drafting
of Section 268 and its inclusion in the legislation, had two immediate
motivations. He desired to avoid the heavy tax levy which otherwise
might follow immediately upon reorganization because of a scaling
down of liabilities. Also, he felt a concept that would make creditors'
forgiveness subject debtors to a tax upon their 'de facto' property,
"was repugnant to common sense and justice."8 The treasury insisted
upon the adoption of Section 270 to qualify Section 268 so as to obviate
the use of a Chapter X reorganization for tax avoidance, but the
necessity of Section 270 for this purpose is questionable because of
the protection afforded by Section 269.9 This section could inde-
pendently furnish the Treasury Department adequate protection
against the use of a Chapter X plan for tax avoidance. Section 269
allows objection to the plans confirmation by the treasury if one of
its principal purposes is the avoidance of taxes. In practice, this sec-
tion is rarely used.
As enacted in 1938, Section 270 provided in essence for the re-
duction of the tax basis of the transferee's assets, by that amount which
would equal the amount by which the indebtedness of the transferor
had been reduced or cancelled. In the case of a recapitalization the
basis of the assets retained by the corporation were reduced by the
above amount. It was possible, through a literal application of Sec-
tion 270, to end up after an insolvency reorganization with the trans-
feree corporation or recapitalized corporation having a basis on its
assets of less than zero. The obvious effect of this section was the
negation of any permanent tax advantage previously conferred by Sec-
tion 268. The reduction of basis had an immediate effect upon the in-
come of the reoganized corporation. The question also arose as to
whether Section 270 was to be applicable only in conjunction with
Section 268, or would operate independently of any finding of tax
benefit under Section 26810 The amendment"" of Section 270 in 1940
-;284 U.S. 1 (1931).
7 Mr. Banks discusses his part in the enactment of these sections in a discussion
carried on by the Chicago Bar Association. See Bankruptcy Committee of
Chicago Bar Association Discusses Section 270, Chapter X of the Chandler
Act, A 5 Corp. Reorg. 236, 240 (1943).
,Ibid. at 239.052 STAT. 904 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §669 (1946).
'" For a discussion of the precise problem created by Sections 268 and 270, see
Claridge Apartments Co. v. Comm'r., 323 U.S. 141, 146 (1944) ; also cf. Darrell,
Creditors Reorganization and the Federal Income Tax, 57 HAIZ. L. Rav. 1009,
1016 (1944).
1 54 STAT. 709 (1940), 11 U.S.C. §670 (1946). The amendment was to be
retroactive to June 22, 1938. For a brief comment on the results of this
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lessened its impact by placing a "floor" beneath the possible reduction
of the reorganized corporation's basis: not less than the fair market
value of the property in question, calculated as of the date of the in-
solvency reorganization plan's confirmation.
As amended, Section 270 continued to operate to the substantial
financial disadvantage of various reorganized corporations. The
following example is not 2 typical. Z. corporation went through a
tax free reorganization before the passage of Section 270. The future
earning power of Z was predicated in part upon the predicted amount
of depreciation available, calculated on the assumption that Z would
have the same basis as its transferor. The purpose of Z in obtaining the
tax free reorganization was its desire to retain the original basis of
$5,000,000. Applying Section 270, the treasury estimated the fair mar-
ket value at the time of the transaction to have been $2,500,000. As-
suming a depreciation rate of 5% and a corporate income tax rate of
40%, the application of Section 270 reduced the annual income of Z by
$50,000. The reduced basis also can often have the collateral effect of
lessening the likelihood of the future transfer of the property, this
being especially true when the market value fixed by the treasury is
determined during a period of economic stress. This reduction of in-
come means that the original equity interests have even less chance
of maintaining any interest in the reorganized corporation.
Another highly objectionable result of Section 270 is that it leaves
the fair market valuation in abeyance. Although the valuation is based
upon the value of the property as of the date of final apporval of the
plan of reorganization, the determination is to be made subsequent to
this approval by the Treasury Department."3 The plan must be ap-
proved by the Bankruptcy Court without the inculsion of the deprecia-
tion basis. It is strongly suggested that this determination should be
made during the formulation of the plan and by the bankruptcy Court,
whose acquiescence is requisite for approval of the plan. It is difficult to
preceive a completely satisfactory plan of reorganization with so fun-
damental an item as the depreciation basis undetermined. It would not
jeopardize the interests of the Treasury to at least require a deter-
mination of value at such time as to prove of some value in the formu-
lation of the plan of reorganization. But this final suggestion would
require a change in Section 270.
attempt see, Hanna and MacLachlin, The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as Amended,
4th ed. 222, 224 (1951).
12A5 Corp. Reorg. 236, 239 (1943).
3354 STAT. 709 (1940), 11 U.S.C. §670 (1946), "The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall prescribe
such regulations as he may deem necessary in order to reflect such decrease
in basis for Federal income tax purposes and otherwise carry- into effect the
purposes of this section."
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APPLICABLE REVENUE CODE PROVISION
The enactment of Sections 112(b)(10) and 113(a)(22), read
in conjunction with Section 112(1),15 relieve those reorganizations that
qualify within the wording of the statute from the operation of Sec-
tion 270. The new corporation takes the insolvent's assets at the in-
colvent's basis. Similarly Section 112(1)111 provides that no gain or
loss is recognized to those security holders of the solvent corpora-
tion, who exchange their securities on the insolvent corporation for
those of the reorganized corporation.
A corporation, in order to qualify under Section 112(b) (10), must
be in receivership, foreclosure or similar proceedings, or in a proceed-
ing under Chapter X or former Section 77B. There must be a trans-
fer of property by the corporation pursant to a court order. The
transfer must be to another corporation, but only to one organized or
made use of to effectuate a plan of reorganization approved by the
court.17 The transfer must also be made in exchange "solely for stock
or securities" in the transferee corporation, subject to the provisions
of Sections 112(d) and 112(k). The definition of reoganization found
in Section 112(g) is not applicable. It is necessary to look to Section
112(b) (10) for the definition of reorganization that is to be applied.
While the new definition is enlarged and meant to allow greater flex-
ibility in the drawing up of reorganization plans, it remains bound by
the judicial' qualifications applicable to Section 112(g) reorganiza-
tions. It is to be noted that this tax provision does not cover a large
part of the reorganization field encompassed by Chapter X. By the
terms of Section 112(b) (10), utilization of another corporate entity
is mandatory. This requirement necessarily and purposely excludes 9
any reorganization consummated by an adjustment of the capital and
debt structure of the insolvent corporation without a transfer of prop-
14 TNT. REv. CODE §113(a) (22). The basis provision for §112(b) (10).
15 Added to the Code by §121(b) of the Revenue Act of 1943.
18 For a discussion of the effect of §112(1) see, Pacific Public Service Co. v.
Comm'r., 4 T.C. 742 (1944).
'7A Chapter X Petition will be approved only if the Bankruptcy Court is
satisfied "that the corporation is insolvent or unable to pay its debts as they
mature." 52 STAT. 886 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §530 (1946).
s H R. REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1944). "It is intended, however,
that only an actual reorganization of a corporation will be covered as dis-
tinguished from a liquidation in a bankruptcy proceeding and sale of property
to either new or old interests supplying new capital and discharging the
obligations of the old corporation. It is also intended that the business purpose
test enunciated in Gregory v. Helvering (293 U.S. 465), shall likewise apply to
transactions under these amendments."; For reorganizations that do not
qualify, cf. Mascot Stove Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F. (2d) 153 (6th Cir. 1941) ;
Templeton's Jewelers, Inc. v. U.S. 126 F. (2d) 251 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Chicago
Stadium Co. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 889 (1949); Harbor Building Trust v.
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1321 (1951).
19 Ibid. "This amendment has no application to reorganizations consummated by
adjustment of the capital or debt structure of the insolvent corporation without
the transfer of its assets to another corporation."
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erty "to another corporation organized or made use of." The limited
coverage of Section 112(b) (10) results in the following dissimilarities.
The basis provision, Section 113(a) (22), enacted to complement
Section 112(b) (10), provides that if the property was acquired by
the corporation as a party to a reorganization qualifying under Sec-
tion 112(b) (10). Section 270 of the Bankruptcy Act will have no
effect. The application of this Section to a Chapter X reorganization
results in the insolvent corporation finally receiving the benefit origin-
ally intended to be conferred by Section .268. But, because of the
limited application of Section 112(b) (10), Section 270 still applies
to those Chapter X reorganizations that are cast in form of a recapital-
ization. Provision originally was made for recapitalizations in the Sen-
ate draft of the Revenue Act of 1943.20 The section proposed was
comparable to the present Section 112(b) (10). It was dropped with-
out explanation in the Conference Committee, but Section 113(b) (4)
was added to avoid the application of Section 270 to those recapitaliza-
tions begun under Section 77B and having a final judgment or decree
entered prior to September 22, 1938.
In practice, the judicial interpretation of Section 270 has minimized
the tax discrimination between reorganizations and recapitalizations.
To determine the direction and remaining impact of Section 270, it
is necessary to examine the judicial construction of the terms "Can-
cellation and reduction." It was the intention of one of the participat-
ing draftsmen of this legislation2' that these terms receive a narrow
construction. A debt is not to be considered cancelled unless the
2ORevenue Act of 1943, Successive Drafts and Reports; (SEN. REP. No. 3687,
78th Cong., 2d. Sess. 54 (1943). Passed by Senate; (33) Sec. (115 )
Reorganization by Adjustment of Capital and Debt Structure of an Existing
Corporation.
"If the reorganization of a corporation (other than a railroad corporation as
defined in Section 77M of the National Bankruptcy Act, as amended) in a
receivership proceeding or in a proceeding under Section 77B of Chapter X
of the National Bankruptcy Act, as amended, is consummated under a plan by
adjustment of the capital and debt structure of an existing corporation
rather than by a transfer of the assets to a successor corporation, then,
at the election of the Taxpayer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 270
of the National Bankruptcy Act, as amended, the basis of such assets shall
be the same as immediately prior to the reorganization and for the purposes
of Sections 718 and 760, the reorganized corporation shall be treated as
if it were a corporation which acquired .the assets pursuant to a plan of
reorganization, in exchange for the stock and securities and an assumption
of the liabilities of such corporation as reorganized. This paragraph shall
not apply if any of the persons who were shareholders of the coiporation
immediately before the reorganization are shareholders of the corporation
immediately after the reorganization by reason of a continuing equity in the
assets of the corporation attributable to such shareholders solely by reason of
their ownership of stock. The term 'reorganization,' as used in this paragraph,
shall not be limited by the definition of such term in Section 112(g)."
"The election under this section shall be made under such rules and regula-
tions as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe."
21 Mr. Banks, A5 Corp. Reorg. 236, 242 (1943).
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creditors are left with nothing in its stead. Applying this intended
construction to an exchange of bonds for other securities, for instance
stock, the transfer would not result in a debt reduction or cancellation,
but rather a change in the form of claim retained by the creditor. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue took a much narzower view of
these terms. Before the passage of Section 270, the Commissioner had
already contended, in Commissioner v. Capento Securities Corp.,22 that
vhen the corporation, during the taxable year, received back and can-
celled it bonds with a face value of $500,000 in exchange for the is-
suance of its preferred stock worth only $50,000, the corporation real-
ized a taxable gain of $450,000. The court dismissed the commis-
sioner's argument on two grounds: that this transaction fell under
Section 112(b) (3), therefore no gain or loss was recognizable; and
that the transaction produced no income chargeable to the corporation.
Admittedly, there was a discharge of liability but at the same time a
new capital stock interest was created which became a balance sheet
liability. The court found no present realization of income arising
from the transaction. The Tax Court, in Alcazar Hotel Inc., 23 extended
this principal to the exchange of common stock for mortgage notes
and accumulated interest. In Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust,2 4
the court asserted that the exchange of stock for bonds did not fall
within the meaning of cancellation, but rather the transaction could
be considered merely a substitution of common stock for bonds in
a reorganization proceeding. The Tax Court, in Tower Bldg. Corp.,25
said:
"In the instant case we likewise hold that the exchange of
the petitioner's new stock for its first and second mortgage
bonds, unsecured claims, and old stock in accordance with a plan
approved in the 77B proceeding did not amount to a cancella-
tion or reduction of indebtedness under Section 270 of the
Bankruptcy Act, as amended."
This decision would appear to affirm the Motor Mart doctrine suffic-
iently so as to allow the use of recapitalizations when practical, with-
out undue concern for the application of Section 270. The judiciary
having interpreted the legislation as intended by Mr. Banks, the fail-
ure to include recapitalizations within Section 112(b) (10) has, for
the purposes of basis, been largely mitigated.
Whereas Section 112(b) (10) provides its own definition of re-
organization, a recapitalization, except for the limited purposes of
Section 113(b) (4), is governed by the form required under Sec-
tion 112(g)1(d) as qualified by Sections 112(b) (2) and 112(b) (3).
22 140 F. (2d) 382 (1st Cir. 1944), aff'g 47 B.T.A. 691 (1942).
231 T.C. 872 (1943).
'44 T.C. 931 (1945), aff'd 156 F. (2d) 122 (1st Cir. 1946).
- Tower Bldg. Corp., 6 T.C. 125, 135 (1946).
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While the statute does not specifically define the term, a recapilization
can generally be categorized as encompassing those reorganizations
wherein the corporation readjusts its capital structure within the exist-
ing corporate identity. This2 6 does not preclude amending the corp-
orate charter. Section 112(b) (2) limits the exchange within the corp-
oration to like stock for stock, common for common and preferred
for preferred. Section 112(b) (3), specifying the exchange of stock
and securities for stock and securities, enables greater flexibility
and is most often found applicable. As shall be noted subsequently,
the most serious limitation faced by a Chapter X recapitalization
arises from the restricted definition that has been given the term
"security."
The continuity27 of interest issue is present in both Chapter X re-
capitalizations and reorganizations and should be mentioned, though
briefly. It was decided that creditors took "full priority" in the assets
of a corporation during either bankruptcy or equity receiverships in
Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. Boyd.28 The Supreme Court, faced with
a continuity of interest problem 29 in Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic
Limestone Co., the question arising as to how a proprietary interest
could continue through an insolvency reorganization, concluded that
both the secured and unsecured creditors could take over the equity
interests of the insolvent corporation. That is, upon an insolvency re-
organization, the bondholders and other creditors of the insolvent corp-
oration could be given stock of the new corporation, the old equity in-
terests having been eliminated; and viewing the creditors as the ben-
eficial owners of the equity in the insolvent corporation, the subsequent
transfer to these creditors maintained the required continuity of in-
terest. Similarily, an exchange of stock of the recapitalized corp-
oration for outstanding bonds and creditors claims should satisfy the
continuity of interest requirement. Under the above doctrine, the cred-
itors have assumed the equity interest at some moment before the
actual transfer. Thus the transfer simply continues the interest. There
is no reason to doubt that the proposition outlined in Asphaltic applies
equally to all insolvency reorganizations. As pointed out by Dean
Griswold, 0 the continuity of interest requirement originated in a con-
tinuity of interest requirement originated in a construction of the
words "consolidation and merger," so that there originally was little
26 For a discussion of possibilities in recapitalizations, see William A. McSwain,
Recapitalizations, 27 TAXES 1065 (1949).
27 For pertinent comment see, Notes (1947) 56 YALE L. J. 891.
28228 U.S. 482 (1912).
29315 U.S. 179 (1942).
so See Erwin Griswold, "Securities" and' "Continuity of Interest," 58 HARv. L.
REv. 705 (1945).
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if any applicability to a recapitalization. 13 But it would seem that a mul-
titude of courts have failed to see this valid distinction and continue to
apply the test to all tax-free reorganizations.
Because the term securities is not defined in the Internal Revenue
Code, it is necessary to look to the courts for a working definition. Un-
fortunately for the party hoping to go through an insolvency recapital-
ization, the term has been given a narrow construction. Pinellas Ice
and Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner 2 and.Cortland Specialty Co. v.
Commissioner 3 while not defining securities, said that a short term
note did not come within the applicable meaning, but was the equiva-
lent of cash. Obviously this construction limits the availability of re-
capitalization as a practical means of insolvency reorganization. As
Dean Griswold noted: 34
"As long as current doctrine that notes are not securities pre-
vails, it would seem to be impossible to have a tax free recap-
italization of any corporation no matter how much such a
recapitalization may be needed as a matter of business pro-
cedure and convenience, where a part of the claims against
the corporation is represented by notes or open accounts, as
distinguished from stocks and bonds."
Re-examining the limitations imposed upon the term securities,
would it not be plausible to contend that because of the application
of the "full priority" doctrine to creditors' claims in an insolvency
reorganization, the court should look at the "substituted interest" as
a security, satisfactory for the purpose of fulfilling the satutory re-
quirement of an exchange solely for stock and securities? The cred-
itros are now the beneficial equity owners of the corporation; they
have this "substituted interest" whether the former security interest
was secured or unsecured. Relying upon the validity of the Aspaltic
doctrine, a court could reasonably recognize that, in fact, these former
creditors are holders of securities, that is, the original interest has been
replaced by a "substituted interest" which is the equivalent of securit-
ies for the purposes of Section 112(b) (3).
Though the courts have not as yet accepted "substituted interests"
as the equivalent of securities, the concept of securities is being broad-
ened. In Hoagland Co.,35 the Tax Court concluded that the exchange
of capital stock for the cancellation of a note came within the pro-
visions of Section 112(b) (3). Whether the promissory note was
considered a security was not placed in issue by the petititioner. Al-
31 For a discussion of the background and development of the "Continuity of
Interest" concept, see, Valentine Brookes, The Continuity of Interest Test in
Reorganizations-a Blessing or a Curse, 34 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1946).32287 U.S. 462 (1933).
33 60 F. (2d) 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).34 Griswold, supra note 30, at 718.35 Hoagland Co. 42 B.T.A. 13 (1940), aff'd 121 F. (2d) 962 (2d Cir. 1941).
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though the second circuit affirmed the decision, Judge Learned Hand's
opinion proceeds on alternative grounds so that the decision can in
no way be cited as firm authority for the proposition that a promissory
note now qualifies as a security. It appears that, while tempting to give
the term more flexibility, the courts refuse to refute the basic limita-
tions imposed in Pinellas.
If the party receiving the stock or security has any stock or se-
curity to give in return, regardless of its present value or lack of same,
the door is apparently open to all additional claims along with the ex-
change of the stock or securities.36
There are several avenues of possible relief short of legislative
redetermination of the meaning of securities. The Court can reexamine
Pinellas and, short of repudiating it, can narrowly limit the case. But
if the past is any indication of the future there is small chance of
this. A judicial recognition of "substituted interests" as securities in
insolvency reorganizations should be possible within the ambit of
Pinellas. Until one of the above possibilities is realized, recapitaliza-
tion, under a Chapter X plan, excepting for particularly favorable
circumstances such as found in the Robert Dollar Co. case,37 is un-
available to the majority of insolvent corporations.3" An insolvent
United Gas Improvement Co. v. Comm'r., 142 F. (2d) 216 aff'g 47 B.T.A. 715.
The parent Co. cancelled all of its stock, held to be an exchange. Estelle
Pardee Erdman, PH 1946 T. C. MEM. DEc. 72. The petitioner, in exchange
for an open account and notes, received notes maturing in 20 years and new
stock. The maturity dates of the old notes were not shown, but the failure of
proof on the part of the respondent may not be used to base a holding that
the obligations were short term notes and, therefore, not securities within the
statute. The notes and stock received in the exchange are clearly securities
under the statute. The fact that an ordinary debt due from the reorganized
corporation formed part of the consideration for the exchange does not take
the exchange out of Section 112(b) (3) ; Comm'r. v. Bachrach, 182 F. (2d)
261 (7th Cir. 1950). Exchange by corporation of certificates of indebtedness
for second mortgage bonds according to a 77B plan of reorganization qualifies
under Section 112(b) (3) ; Comm'r. v. Carman, 189 F. (2d) 363 (2d Cir. 1951).
Old bonds and past due interest held to constitute single claim and exchange
for new bonds and stock including stock allocated to this accumulated and
unpaid interest will qualify under Section 112(b) (3); Robert Dollar Co.
18 T.C. 444 (1952). Stock declared valueless and cancelled by the court
handling the 77B reorganization. Old stock holder also creditor and received
new stock based upon the value of its creditors claims. Court refuses to accept
the bankruptcy court's valuation and discovers that the stock (original) still
has some value and says that this stock as well as the creditors' claims are
exchanged for the new stock and the reorganization therefore qualifies under
X Section 112(b) (3). This is stretching form to extremes.
3 Robert Dollar Co., supra note 36.
's Another possible obstacle to be faced in an insolvency recapitalization is
state regulation, SEN. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1943), "Where
the corporation is insolvent, this type of adjustment is generally not possible
for the reason that under the absolute priority rule stockholders may no
longer have an interest in the corporation and, therefore, may not participate
in the corporation as reorganized. In order to use the old corporate structure
to effect the reorganization, it is usually necessary that amendments to the
Articles of Incorporation be made. Where the stockholders do not participate
in the corporation as reorganized, it is more often than not impossible to
[Vol. 37
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corporation will ordinarily require that a substantial amount of cred-
itors' claims be settled during the reorganization, and, as previously
noted, stock and securities of the recapitalized corporation are not
available for the satisfaction of general creditors.
While the phrase "solely for stock and securities" is also found in
Section 112(b)(10), the restrictive effect is alleviated by reference
to Section 112(k). This section provides for the assumption of the
insolvent corporation's liabilities by the transferee corporation, made
use of in the Chapter X plan. Thereafter the new corporation's man-
ner of handling the assumed liabilities will have no effect upon the
original qualification within Section 112(b) (10).
POSSIBILITY OF CARRY-OVERS
As noted, the statutory language of Section 112(b) (10) requires
a transfer of the insolvent corporation's assets to another corporation.
This requirement subjects the newly reorganized corporation to the
limitations enunciated in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,39 where-
in the court rejected the contention that a newly reorganized corpora-
tion, taking over assets and liabilities of the old coporation and op-
erating the business as if no change had occured in the corporate struc-
ture, was for all practical purposes the same entity as the old corpora-
tion and ,therefore, the same "taxpayer": it following that the new
corporation should be able to take advantage of the old corporation's
net operating losses. Rather, the court contended, there is a separate
and distinct successor entity created and it is viewed as such by all of
the concerned parties. Of course, the distinctness was emphasized in
New Colonial because, while not transacting business of any kind, the
transferor corporation was not liquidated until more than a year after
the reorganization. The court was able to point to two individual corp-
orations in existence at the same time to bolster its contention that
the transferee was an entirely independent coroporation. This has
not become a determinative factor and the immediate dissolution of
the transferor corporation has not effected the outcome under New
Colonial, Inc. Thus qualification under the terms of Section 112(b)
(10) eliminates the advantage of those net operating losses that usually
are available to the insolvent corporation.
This result is infortuitous in that such a tax advantage would act
obtain the vote of a sufficient number of shares to amend the Articles. In
some few states, however, the state laws provide that the Trustee in bankruptcy
or receivership proceedings may vote the shares of the insolvent corporation.
In such cases reorganization is easier than to transfer to a new corporation."
It would seem that in the light of Chapter X and the general doctrine of
Federal Supremacy, the bankruptcy court can order the stock of displaced
shareholders to be voted by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, the above observation
is unduly pessimistic. See Cram Dowm clause 52 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§616 (1946).
39292 U.S. 435 (1934).
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as a stimulus to insolvent corporations to seek a reorganization rather
than liquidation. The largest number of insolvency reorganizations
occur during the event of a depression or recession, and it can safely
be assumed that the adverse market and general outlook facing the
reorganized corporation will be closely parallel to that market faced
by its predecessor. The aid gained from the carry-over of the pred-
ecessor's net operating losses could prove a significant factor in the
corporation regaining financial solidarity. Chapter X was provided to
enable faltering industrials to revive. To revive the allowance of this
carry-over would certainly advance that policy.
A possible40 means to avoid New Colonial Ice may have been pre-
sented in Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner,4' wherein the second
circuit decided that in a merger of two corporations the surviving corp-
oration could make use of the former and now extinct corporation's
excess profits tax credit. In that instance the operating corporation was
merged with the holding company. The Tax Commissioner had refused
to allow the resulting organization, which had taken the name of the
operating corporation, to carry over the excess profits credits due the
former operating corporation. But the court refused to apply New
Colonial Ice. Instead the court said,
"We must regard the resulting corporation as the union of
component corporations into an all endeavoring whole which
absorbs the rights and priviledges, as well as the obligations, of
its constituents."
The court placed great stress on the fact that the statute refers to
"taxpayers." It concludes that the corporation, because of the con-
tinuity of the business enterprise, the assumption of liabilities and the
primary liability for taxes of the old corporation, should be viewed
as the same "taxpayer." Section 112(b) (10) reorganizations can be
cast in the form of a merger to take advantage of Stanton.
Whether Stanton could at present be extended to net operating
losses seems doubtful in light of the fact that New Colonial Ice re-
mains unimpeached. Still it would follow that if the court's logic is
valid in regards the excess profits tax credits, it should be equally
applicable to net operating losses. The expansion of this reasoning to
insolvency reorganizations would end the unequal tax treatment that
results from differences in form. But for the present, Stanton has been
refused extension by the Tax Court. 43 In a very recent case the Dis-
trict Court specifically refused to apply Stanton4 4 to the attempted
40 EIden McFarland, Carry-Overs to Continuing Corporations, 28 TAXES 765
(1950).
41 176 F. (2d) 573 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'g 11 T.C. 310 (1948).
2176 F. (2d) 573 (2d Cir. 1949).
43 California Casket Co., 19 T.C., No. 7 (1952).
44Follansbee Steel Corp. v. U.S., 109 F.Supp. 635 (W.D. Penn. 1953); 336P-H
1953, at p.72.
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carry-over of net operating losses by a newly reorganized corporation,
The corporation, following a Section 77B plan of reorganization, had
acquired assets and assumed liabilities of the old company. The tenor
of the opinion certainly precludes hope of the extension of the Stanton
case to cover the above situation. Apparently a change in the statute
governing insolvency reorganizations will be required to allow the carry-
over of net operating losses. The American Bar Association 5 has
recommended an amendment to the Code that would allow the trans-
feree corporation, participating in a tax free reorganization, to take
full advantage of net operating losses and unused excess profits cred-
it carry-overs. In order that this same problem, that is, the inequality
of treatment as between recapitalizations and reorganizations, might
be eliminated in railroad reorganizations, 6 a statute was passed allow-
ing the carry-over of these items regardless of the form of the re-
organization chosen. This motivation is an equally valid one when ap-
plied to industrial and other insolvency reorganizations.
Ordinarily the newly reorganized corporation cannot take advan-
tage of any deficit in earnings and profits suffered by the predecessor
insolvent corporation. The customary form of a Section 112(b) (10)
reorganization places the insolvent corporation in the position of the
corporation that is to be elinminated, while the transferee is viewed as
the surviving corporation. In light of the doctrine enunciated in Com-
missioner v. Phipps,47 there can be no carry-over of the earnings
deficit to the transferee corporation so as to begin the earnings history
of the surviving corporation with this beneficial deficit. The language
of the statute is explicit and definitely fixes the form of the transfer,
"a transfer to a corporation organized or made use of." It must be
concluded that the present wording and interpretation of Section 112
(b) (10) affords no opportunity for the transferee corporation's bene-
ficial use of the transferor's net operating losses or earnings deficits.
The possibility of arranging a Chapter X reorganization so as to
take advantage of the deficit in earnings of the insolvent corporation
is undoubtedly present.48 The Court's interpretation of Harter v.
Helvering49 would seem to encourage such a juggling of the reorgan-
ization plan. That is, instead of having a new corporation take over
the assets of the insolvent corporation, make use of an existing corp-
45 Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
983 (1947). This recommendation did not specifically refer to insolvency
reorganizations but recommended amendments to Sections 122(b) and
710 (c) (3).
46161 STAT. 249 (1947). 26 U.S.C. 122 effected transactions prior to Jan. 1, 1950.47336 U.S. 410 (1949).
48 See, Thomas N. Tarleau, Some Tax Considerations in Reorganizations of
Insolvent Corporations, 8 N.Y.U.-IqsT. ox FED. TAXATlON 202, 207 (1950).
But see Note, The Effect of Tax Free Reorganizations on Subsequent Cor-
porate Distributions, 48 CoL. L. R. 281 (1948).
49 79 F. (2d) 12 (2d Cir. 1935).
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oration by merging it into the insolvent corporation, making the in-
solvent corporation the surviving corporation. But the practicality of
this procedure must be measured in the light of the complications that
are sure to arise.
Following this tangent, the reorganization would immediately lose
the benefits of Section 112(b) (10) specifically, exemption from Sec-
tion 270 of the Bankruptcy Act and also the benefit of the definition
of reorganization in Section 112(b) (10). Sections 112(c),(d) and (k)
would still apply, assuming the reorganization qualified under Sec-
tions 12(b) (4) or (5). It is extremely questionable, of course,
whether this roundabout means of reorganization, obviously chosen
because of the tax advantage, would meet with the Bankruptcy Court's
approval. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has a valid right to
challenge the reorganization plan in the bankruptcy Court, invoking
Section 269,50 and though in practice this is seldom done, in the afore-
mentioned variation of Chapter X Plan it must be considered as a
definite possibility. Section 129 would also provide an obstacle to this
kind of plan, except for the case of insolvency in the subsidiary of a
solvent corporation. Weighing these impediments against the possible
advantage to be gained by the carry-over of the assumed earnings
deficit, 1 it becomes clear that an unusual factual situation is required to
justify the risk of a taxable transfer that is inherent in the deviation
from a Section 112(b) (10) plan of reorganization.
Where the same corporate entity is maintained through the insol-
vency reorganization, that is, a recapitalization, the doctrine of New
Colonial Ice is inapplicable. Full advantage can be taken of net operat-
ing losses and excess profit tax credits because, for tax purposes as
well as in fact, the same corporate entity is continued although the
personality of the equity interests may be completely changed. As
recognized earlier, the reorganizational possibilities are limited under
Section 112(g) (1) (d) or a greater number of insolvent coporations
would take advantage of these benefits. Obviously the temptation is
always present, but the statutory framework remains inflexible. Even
though this statutory hurdle is passed, the recapitalization falls out-
side of the beneficial basis provisions, but is no longer a considera-
tion of overwhelming proportions.
A052 STAT. 904 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §669 (1946). "Where it appears that a plan has
for one of its principal purposes the avoidance of taxes, objection to its
confirmation may be made on that ground by the Secretary of the Treasury,
or in the case of a State, by the corresponding official or other person so
authorized. Such objections shall be heard and determined by the judge,
independently of other objections which may be made to the confirmation of
the plan, and, if the judge shall be satisfied that such purpose exists, he shall
refuse to confirm the plan."5i It is assumed in the discussion that the insolvent corporation has a substantial
earnings deficit.
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Congress was cognizant of this inconsistent treatment. The Sen-
ate52 attempted to rectify the situation insofar as excess profits cred-
its were concerned, but because of House opposition the attempt
proved abortive.
The taxpayer, about to undertake an insolvency reorganization, has
at least three possible choices under a Chapter X plan: a Section 112
(b) (10) reorganization, a Chapter X plan not qualifying under Sec-
tion 112(b) (10) because of its attempt to take advantage of Harter,
that is, take advantage of deficit earnings, and a chapter X recapital-
ization. The tax consequences of each differ to such an extent that
the primary purpose of a Chapter X plan, the strongest possible cap-
ital structure for the reorganized corporation, must compete with the
taxpayer's desire to obtain the most favorable tax treatment. This re-
sult is not consistent with the overall policy of the Bankruptcy Act.
HUmfPAGE CASE-EARNINGS AND PROFITS
Finally, we look to the possibility of the application of the doctrine
originating in Commissioner v. Sansome53 to a Chapter X reorganiza-
tion. Upon observation, it is noted that in the great majority of in-
stances the insolvent corporation will be without earnings and profits,
for seven these earnings totally diminished by the operating losses that
eventually result in insolvency. But as exemplified by Humpage v.
Commissioner," an insolvent corporation possessing earnings and pro-
fits at the time of its reorganization is possible. Disregarding for the
moment whether earnings and profits should be carried forward if
present in the insolvent corporation, the immediate issue is, have such
earnings and profits been subject to the Sansome reasoning? The
Humpage case is the first to decide this question. The Tax Court con-
cludes that the "Sansome Rule"5  is not applicable to a Section 77B
reorganization.
In the Humpage case, the Commissioner attempted to assess an ad-
ditional tax upon two shareholders of the Fisher Corporation, 6 on the
determination that the dividend received by each from the Fisher
Corporation was taxable as ordinary income, because the Fisher Corp-
poration had accumulated earnings and profits sufficient to cover the
entire dividend. Fisher Corporation, the successor of Fisher Com-
pany, was organized under a Section 77B plan of reorganization in
52 See note 20 supra.
1360 F. (2d) 931 (2d Cir. 1932).
5417 T.C. 1625 (1952).
a5 The court refers to the application of the Sansome case as the "Sansome Rule."
That is, all earnings and profits are continued in a tax free reorganization
where the assets of one corporation are transferred to a successor corporation.
The term will be used in this article only as it was applied by the Tax Court
in the Humpage Case.
511 The insolvent corporation shall be referred to as the Fisher Company and
the successor corporation shall be referred to as the Fisher Corporation.
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1935. Its predecessor was the guarantor of the payment of principal
and interest on an outstanding issue of mortgage and gold bonds valued
at $3,000,000, issued by the Montauck Corporation and defaulted by
same in 1932. Fisher Company underwent a voluntary reorganization
under Section 77B because of its inability to meet this guarantee. Be-
cause it kept its accounts on a cash basis, Fisher Company was un-
able to credit this fixed liability against its surplus or realize an operat-
ing loss that would have totally extinguished the earnings and profits.
This resulted in the anomalous situation of Fisher Company having
a fixed liability of over $3,000,00057 on its guarantee and earnings and
profits of approximately $2,500,000"s when it underwent its insolvency
reorganization.
After determining that the plan of reorganization qualified as tax
free, the Commissioner applied the "Sansome Rule" and held that the
Fisher Corporation had acquired the $2,500,000 in earnings and pro-
fits from the insolvent Fisher Company. The reorganization wiped out
the entire equity interests of the former shareholders, the liability on
the guarantee being satisfied by a distribution of stock of the Fisher
Corporation to the former Bond holders.
The Tax Court reversed the Commissioner, deciding that the earn-
ings of Fisher Company did not pass to the Fisher Corporation and
hence were not a part of Fisher Corporation's earnings and profits.
Thus so much of the dividend as exceeded the corporation's earn-
ings and profits, accrued in the year of the dividend and accum-
lated since the reorganization, was a return of capital and not taxable
as ordinary income. The court's rationalization follows.
Under the doctrine proclaimed in Asphaltic, the creditors took
"full priority" in the assets of the insolvent corporation and became
the beneficial equity owners of the corporation before the formal re-
organization. Such a change in interest took place at the time when
the creditors invoked their legal rights, in this case represented by the
petition under 77B, although the court does not state definitely when
the change took place. Then turning to McClintic Estate v. Commis-
sioner,59 for the proposition that the acquisition of the ownership of
the assets of a corporation carries with it ownership of the surplus,
the court concluded that the surplus, including the earnings and pro-
fits, passed to the former creditors of Fisher Company along with
that company's assets when the creditors took their equitable interest
under the "full priority" doctrine. The Court said :60
57 The bond liability including interest was $3,213,240.58 The earnings and profits at the time of the 77B reorganization totaled not less
than $2,188,183.27 or more than $2,395,093.93.
5947 B.T.A. 188 (1942).
coHumpage v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1625, 1633 (1952).
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"Whether or not the claim of the Montauk bondholders under
the guarantee served to reduce Fisher Company's accumulated
earnings such earnings were distributed to the creditors when
they acquired beneficial ownership of the assets and they were
no longer earnings in the hands of Fisher Company."
The court calls the subsequent transfer of the assets from Fisher Com-
pany to its successor in effect a purchase of the shares of the successor.
In order to support its position the Tax Court has made an at-
tenuated interpretation of the Asphaltic case and the "full priority"
doctrine. In effect, it is proposing that when the creditors take over
the position of the former equity owners, they have purchased the so-
called surplus along with the corporate assets. The court doesn't de-
cide whether or not this is a taxable transaction, but infers that if
any loss or gain results it should be recognized at this time. It has
looked at this change in interest as a psuedo purchase of the corpora-
tion's assets with the accompanying devolution of earnings and pro-
fits. The invalidity of this approach is obvious.
When the creditors gain their substituted interest, they have ob-
tained the interest of the former shareholders. A transaction much
more analogous to the situation involved above would be illustrated
by a sale by each of the shareholders of his equity interest, as repre-
sented by his own particular shares, to the creditors. It is nowhere
contended that the sale of the individual shares is a sale also of the
assets and surplus of a corporation that will be reflected in corporate
accounts, although the share does represent an aliquot interest in the
capital. The corporate entity is unaffected by these transfers among
the shareholders; the surplus and earnings6l continue unchanged as
part of the whole. The Tax Court's reference to the McClintic case
does not sustain its contention. The situation was not at all comparable
to the Humpage case. As pointed out in McClintic, when a corpora-
tion, by means of a split-off or spin-off, transfers property to another
corporation ,it follows that a proportional part of the original corp-
oration's surplus and earnings also pass to the acquiring corporation.
The above situation is not comparable to a sale by X of his stock to Y,
or the substitution of Y as owner of the corporation's stock for X.
Neither of these transactions produces any effect on the corporate
surplus.
The doctrine of "full priority" does not turn on the basis of a
purchase of the assets of the insolvent corporation and in turn a por-
tion of the surplus, but rather, as was emphasized in Asphaltic, a
substitution of the creditors in the place of the shareholders. But the
61 For those itemr and transactions that have an effect on earnings and profits
see W. Austin. Corporate Earnings and Profits Under the Internal Revenue
Code, 4 BAYLOR L. REv. 129 (1952); Arthur R. Albrecht, "Dividends" and
Earnings or Profits, 7 Tax L. Rev. 157 (1952).
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Tax Court viewed this substitution of interest as a separate and in-
dependent transaction. Adherence to the principle of the "full pri-
ority" doctrine does not of itself lead to the possibility of a taxable
transaction. If a liquidation should result from the insolvency pro-
ceedings instead of the reorganization, the "full priority" doctrine
would have effect, but only so far as it established preferences in the
distribution of assets to the creditors.
It is a case of the Tax Court viewing this substitution of in-
terests as a completed transaction, for tax purposes, between the cred-
itor and the corporation rather than as between creditor and share-
holder. It does not follow that the earnings along with surplus of
Fisher Company were distributed to the creditors, when they acquired
the beneficial ownership of the equity interest, any more than it would
follow that earnings and surplus are distributed to new shareholders
when they acquire a proprietary interest upon a purchase of outstand-
ing shares of a corporation. The creditors, whose interests are sub-
stituted, are the equivalent of shareholders during the reorganization
when they receive their interst; rather than being capital in their
hands, it represents a claim to capital.6 2
The Tax Court extends the reasoning of the U.S. v. Cement In-
vestors, Inc.6 3 decision beyond its cognizable limits. The court in that
case refused to decide the issue as to whether the substitution of in-
terests of the creditors for the equity holder's interest was a separate
transaction subject to Section 112(a). It is more feasible to consider
the shifting of the equitable interests in question as part of a con-
templated tax free plan of reorganization. The opposite conclusion
would be a contradiction of the policy of both the Bankruptcy Act and
Internal Revenue Code.
Acceptance of the Tax Court's view would require a definite de-
termination as to precisely when the substitution takes place, so as to
allow the so-called realization of gain or loss to the creditor. Assuming
that such a transfer takes place at the time of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, it would appear that the creditor would never realize a gain.
Such creditor would be receiving a pro rata share of the equity based
upon the amount of credit extended and the priority of same. 64 That
amount would never, at the time of the substitution, exceed the basis
62Humpage v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1625, 1634 (1952), "Whether or not the
extinguishment of the claims of the creditors resulted in gain or loss to them,
the assets that they received constituted capital in their hands."
G" 316 U.S. 527, 535 (1942). "Thus the contention seems to be that, since a gain
arose from a transaction which was separate and distinct from and anterior to
the exchange of property for the new securities, it must be recognized under
the general rule of Section 112(a). We express no view on that contention."
I This discussion encompasses only those parties having acquired an equity
interest prior to the economic failures responsible for loss in value of such
equity interest. The speculative aspect of the problem is not considered herein.
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of the original credit extended. This leads, then, to the problem of
evaluation and recognition of losses. The creditor would begin with
the basis of his bonds or other claims. In order to estimate loss it would
be ncessary to evaluate the equity interests received in satisfaction of
claims at the time of the substitution. At the time of the transaction,
especially in the case of a reorganization, the valuation problem would
be difficult if not impossible. It seems much more reasonable that these
difficulties were meant to be avoided by viewing the substitution as
part of the whole plan and relying upon Sections 113(a) (6) and (a)
(22) to settle the collateral basis problems.
Cement Investors and Asphaltic can best be interpreted in conjunc-
tion with Northern Pacific R.R. v. Boyd and Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Co.65 The concept of the bondholders and creditors simply
taking over the equity interest of the shareholders in part or com-
pletely, obviously used in Asphaltic as a means of maintaining the re-
required continuity of interest, also presents a valid explanation of
what, in fact, occurs. The equity interest is totally submerged by that
of the creditors. It can be maintained by the shareholders, but only by
additional contributions of capital. In the Boyd case the shareholders
equity, i.e. capital, was viewed as a trust fund subject to the payment
of all corporate debts, the shareholders interests remaining unreco-
gnized until fifinal satisfaction of all these claims.
It is necessary to draw the distinction between "full priority" of
creditors in a liquidation, and the same priority in a plan of reorgan-
ization. In the former, the creditors have an absolute preference to
realize upon the assets of the corporation that cannot be denied. But
this in itself does not make the creditors equity holders of the corp-
oration. When the creditors decide not to force a liquidation, but
rather to participate in a plan of reorganization, they then assume a
substituted interest, and can then be called holders of an equity in-
terest. The equity interest received is substituted for their original
claim and its immediate enforcement. In this latter case, the transition
from creditors to equitable owners is part of the contemplated plan of
reorganization. The court has not looked to each particular facet
of a reorganization as a separate transaction. The court said in
Asphaltic,66
"Yet, the separate steps were integrated parts of a single
scheme. Transitory phases of an arrangement frequently are
disregarded under these sections of the revenue acts where they
add nothing of substance to the completed affair."
' 308 U.S. 106 (1939). "It is a fixed principle, governing under 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act as well as in equity reorganizations, that, to the extent of
their debts, creditors are entitled to absolute priority over stockholders against
all the property of an insolvent corporation, relative priority not being
enough."
*;315 U.S. 179, 184 (1942).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
As illustrative of Congressional thought on the subject of collateral
transactions to -a. reorganization, Congress said just after the passage
of Section 112(b) (10) :67
"No antecedent or component transaction in connection with
such relinquishment or extinguishment and subsequent acquisi-
tion is recognized as a taxable event under this amendment."
The Tax Court's assumption that a separate transaction of substance
took place in the Humpage case is falacious. It is necessary to con-
clude, in contradiction to the Tax Court, that the earnings and pro-
fits of Fisher Company did not pass to the creditors at the time of
the insolvency reorganization.
But the issue of whether these earnings and profits should be car-
ried forward in this instance is not concluded. According to the policy
adhered to in Slover v. Commissioner"" and reaffirmed in Munter v.
U.S., 69 the purpose of carrying forward earnings and profits is to
avoid a tax free distribution of accumulated earnings. Is this a possi-
bility in a bonna fide insolvency proceeding? It is perhaps redundant to
say that, ordinary, accumulated income and earnings is the antithesis
of corporate insolvency. The earnings and profits remain in Fisher
Company because of an inadequacy of accounting methods. In fact,
the liability of $3,000,000 was recognized and satisfied during the
reorganization though the earnings and profits could not be correspond-
ing reduced. With the possibility of a tax free distribution removed,
it would follow from Munter that these fictitious earnings and profits
should not be carried forward. The Humpage court also distinguished
this reorganization from the ordinary tax free reorganization because
of the corporation's insolvency, stressing the fact that none of the lit-
igated cases involving the "Sansome Rule" or doctrine were insolvency
reorganizations. The merit of this distinction is questionable except
to emphasize the uniqueness of this situation. Although it has been said
that Sansome7 ° applies to all tax free reorganizations wherein the
transferor corporation has earnings and profits, this case should prove
the exception to the rule, since here the very purpose for its applica-
tion no longer exist.
CONCLUSION
Upon retrospection, it should be obvious that the differences noted
in the tax treatment of reorganizations and recapitalizations points up
7 tH. R. REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1944).
886 T.C. 884, 886 (1946), "The origin and purpose of the "Sansome Rule" has
repeatedly been described as based upon the danger that otherwise distribution
of accumulated earnings to stockholders would escape tax."
89331 U.S. 210 (1947), see Charles W. Tye, Corporate Distributions-Some
Current Trends, 4 TAx L. REv. 459, 472 (1949).
70 Ralph S. Rice, Transfers of Earnings and Deficits in Tax-Free Reorganiza-
tions; the Sansome-Phipps Rule, 5 TAx L. REv. 523, 528 (1950).
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a serious need for corrective legislation. A Section 112(b) (10) re-
organization has the benefit of Section 268 of the Bankruptcy Act
in conjunction with its basis provision, Section 113(a) (22), a more
flexible definition of reorganization, and the possibility of the carry-
over of any unused excess profits credits from its transferor corp-
oration. Recapitalization, while limited by the scope of a Section 112
(g) definition of reorganization, the judicial qualifications of the term
"securities" and denied the benefit of Section 268 by the application
of Section 270, has the advantage of net operating loss carry-over,
excess profits credit carry-over, and the earnings deficit carry-over.
The allowance of these carry-over benefits often makes a recapital-
ization extremely desirable, while the corresponding inflexibility of the
term "securities" usually makes its application unlikely.
Again looking to the primary motivation of Congress for the pas-
sage of Chapter X, the desire to maintain a stable, flexible and healthy
national economy, it is suggested that an amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code is requisite to more successfully achieve this goal. The
composite tax advantages mentioned above should be allowed to all
insolvency reorganizations regardless of form. This can be accom-
plished by a provision amending Section 112(b) (10) to include re-
capitalizations and to specifically provide for the carry-over of net op-
erating losses, excess profits credits and deficit earnings in all insol-
vency reorganizations. In addition, ihe term "securities" should be
given a fresh determination, as regards insolvency reorganizations.
Opposition to the above amendment would in all probability be
vigorous. 71 As an alternative measure, it is recommended that Section
112(b) (10) be amended to include recapitalizations with the more
flexible definition of "securities." It should provide that for purposes
of any insolvency reorganization under Chapter X, regardless of -form,
it will be considered to be a reorganization for tax purposes.
The end result under both of the the suggested amendments is
equality of tax treatment. The form of the reorganization could then
be chosen without undo consideration for tax consequences.
71 As indicative of this opposition see the President's criticism of the Reorgani-
zation provisions in the Revenue Act of 1943, 90th CoNG. RE:c., Feb. 23, 1944
at 1973 (1944).
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